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Comment
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994:
Zero Tolerance Takes Aim at
Procedural Due Process
I. Introduction
It was a phone call that will stay with Denver Police Officer John
Lietz for the rest of his life. Shortly after 11:00 am [on the morn-
ing of April 27, 1999,] he picked up the line to hear the voice of
Matthew Depew, the son of a fellow cop: Depew and 17 other Col-
umbine High School students were trapped in a storage room off
the school cafeteria, hiding from kids with guns .... He could
hear bursts of gunfire in the background. Lietz told the kids to
barricade the door with chairs and sacks of food, and to be ready
to attack the gunmen if they got in.1
Could a news account such as this2 possibly have been
imagined when America envisioned its schools in the Year
2000? New computers, less illiteracy, more support for children
with learning disabilities, and better teacher recruitment may
all come to mind when one thinks of schools in the new mil-
lenium. However, those working to improve our schools have
these and a list of others on their agenda for the Year 2000:
"monitored security cameras and armed law-enforcement of-
1. Matt Bai et al., Anatomy of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 24.
2. See, e.g., Steve Schmidt, Small Town's Horror Hard to Forget: 1996 School
Shooting in Washington First of Deadly Series of Attacks, SAN DIEGO UNmON-TRiB-
uNE, May 23, 1999, at Al; Anatomy of a Massacre, supra note 1, at 24; THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, Radio Address of the President to the Nation
5/23/98 (May 26, 1998) available in 1998 WL 261790 (White House) (commenting
upon the tragic incidents of school violence in Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Ar-
kansas; Pearl, Mississippi; and Edinboro, Pennsylvania all within a year).
1
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ficers, . . . increased awareness of violent characteristics and
drills aimed at guiding students through hostage situations."3
As the new millenium has approached, the public has
grown both in its awareness of school violence, and in its out-
rage that the schools in America could be the settings of weap-
ons violence. In 1994, Congress took action by introducing the
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 4 which encouraged each state re-
ceiving federal funds for education to follow suit and introduce
their own laws, now known as "zero tolerance" laws. 5 As a re-
sult of the introduction of "zero tolerance" laws, the nation is
also seeing news accounts such as these:
Expelled fifth-grader Shanon Borchardt Coslett is waiting to see
whether the school board will let her back into classes this week.
The honor roll student was expelled after she picked up her
mother's lunch box by mistake and brought a paring knife to
school. Shanon, 10, reported her find to a teacher at Twin Peaks
Charter Academy [in Longmont, Colorado]. Administrators said
they had no choice, the law required them to expel the girl.6
By all accounts, 17-year-old Brian Wood was a model student at
Bassett High School in southwestern Virginia .... But during a
class field trip... students were asked to empty their pockets and
Brian pulled from his a two-and-a-half inch knife, one that he said
he accidentally left in his jeans the night before. School adminis-
trators, citing their zero tolerance policy for weapons, expelled
him from school for a year.7
In Muskego, [Wisconsin], two fifth-graders were suspended for
bringing an orange fluorescent toy gun on the school bus. .... 8
This comment argues that the Gun-Free Schools Act of
19949 and the state laws passed in pursuance thereof, "zero tol-
3. Kathleen Mortensen, Schools Look at Myriad of Security Approaches to Pre-
vent Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sept. 29, 1999, at 1, available in 9/
29/99 APWIRES 13:35:00.
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
5. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-841(G) (West 1998); ALASKA STAT.
§ 1403.160 (Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1997).
6. Knife Gets Honor Student Expelled from Her School, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 8, 1998, at A18.
7. Adam Hochberg, Weekend All Things Considered, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERV., November 22, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2564507.
8. Waupun Student Caught With Pistol, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 30,
1998, at 2.
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
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erance" laws, 10 must afford the maximum amount of procedural
due process to the students who are expelled for bringing a
weapon to school. Specifically, these laws have the potential of
imposing strict and harsh punishment upon school children
who are not dangerous and who will only suffer detrimental re-
sults from a full year expulsion. In addition, and perhaps more
irksome, is that these laws do not prevent school violence.
Part II of this comment first examines the nature of every
student's property interest in attending school, which is pro-
tected by the United States Constitution. Second, Part II de-
scribes procedural due process, what it requires at a minimum,
which procedures students are entitled to before expulsion, and
which procedures provide the maximum amount of due process.
Third, this part provides a background of weapons violence in
schools. Fourth is a description of various reactions to school
violence, from schools, parents, and the federal and state gov-
ernments. Fifth, Part II describes the Federal Gun-Free
Schools Act of 199411 and the various state laws that have been
passed in compliance thereof, giving a detailed description of
each state law in chart form.
Part III describes the deficiencies inherent in these laws, in
that the federal law fails to direct the states to provide proce-
dural due process, and many states impose expulsion without
any procedural due process. This part illuminates two evils
caused by the lack of procedural due process: (1) the danger that
these laws will completely fail to protect students' property in-
terest in attending school; and (2) the danger that these laws
will completely fail to prevent dangerous behavior.
Parts IV and V present a solution: All states must provide
formal due process procedures when expelling a student for a
year or more, pursuant to the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.12
10. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-
5.1-10(C), (E), (F) (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE § 280.21B (West 1998).
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
12. Id.
19991 133
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II. Background
A. Students' Property Interest in Attending School
The right to attend school is not a fundamental right.13 In
its discussions about school attendance, the United States
Supreme Court has taken an antithetical view. While recogniz-
ing the historical importance of public education, even recogniz-
ing it as central to a person's function in society and exercise of
other rights, 14 the Court has simultaneously stated that public
education is not a right originating in the Constitution. 15
Historically, courts unanimously recognized the obligation
placed upon the states by the United States Constitution to pro-
vide public education equally. 16 Equality in education was a
concept construed in "judge-made law" from the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 The right to
equal access seemed to border upon a "fundamental right" to
free public education in the 1950's, during the time that the fa-
mous case of Brown v. Board of Education8 was decided. The
Brown Court described education as central to the public inter-
est, and almost stated outright that education was a constitu-
tional right:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate [society's]
13. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND
THE LAW, 132-33 (1987).
14. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
15. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). In Plyler, the Supreme Court
stated:
Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.
But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education
in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its depriva-
tion on the life of the child, mark the distinction.
Id. at 221.
16. "Equality has been the central theme of school law since at least 1954."
DAVIs & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 131 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 132 (citing Westen, The Empty Idea
of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its
Hole, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1983)).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/7
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recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. 19
Other courts followed the reasoning of Brown and, in turn, up-
held education as a near-right. 20 In the 1970's, education
reached its pinnacle of Constitutional importance, during which
time courts began to formally recognize education as a funda-
mental interest.21 For example, in Serrano v. Priest,22 the
Supreme Court of California stated: "We are convinced that the
distinctive and priceless function of education in our society
warrants, indeed, compels our treatment of it as a 'fundamental
interest." 23
This treatment of education as a fundamental interest
changed in the United States Supreme Court decision of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 24 which held
that education is not conferred as a fundamental right in the
United States Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly.25
Without detracting from the importance of education in Ameri-
can society, the Court held that "the importance of a service per-
formed by the State does not determine whether it must be
regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the
Equal Protection Clause."26
Instead of a fundamental right or interest proceeding from
the United States Constitution, the Rodriguez Court held that
education is a benefit, or property interest, conferred by the
states.27 The states, at the time the Constitution was adopted,
took on the responsibility of ensuring that "each child [receives]
19. Id. at 493.
20. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.
1961) (recognizing education as "vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society.")
21. See Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971) (stating that
"it would seem beyond argument that the right to receive a public school education
is a basic personal right or liberty."). Id. at 1158.
22. 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971).
23. Id. at 608-09.
24. 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
25. See 411 U.S. at 35. The plaintiffs attacked the "Texas system of financing
public education," and argued that the poor students living in areas with low prop-
erty tax bases were being denied equal protection. Id. In turn, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that education should be recognized as a fundamental right, due to its
intricate relationship with the fundamental right to free speech. See id. at 5, 35-
36.
26. Id. at 30.
27. See id. at 35.
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an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum skills necessary
for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participa-
tion in the political process."28 Thus, the states assume this re-
sponsibility by imposing an obligation to attend school, and
thereby grant to those students living within their borders a
property interest in receiving a public school education equal to
others in the same state. 29
B. Procedural Due Process
1. Procedural Due Process: the Minimum Required
Procedural due process has been defined by the United
States Supreme Court as "the [central concept in the] imple-
mentation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settle-
ment."30 The requirements of procedural due process apply
when liberty or property interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are deprived by the state in some way.31 The pre-
cise procedures required in these cases depend upon a set of
considerations, which have been defined by the United States
Supreme Court in a number of cases.32
In the majority of cases, the United States Supreme Court
has held that "the right to some kind of prior hearing is para-
mount."33 As described by the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,34
28. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
29. See id.; See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 24.04 (Donald T. Kramer ed.,
Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 2d ed. 1994) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977)). State laws requiring compulsory school attendance were first passed in
the 1900s. See id. § 24.04. By 1918, every state had a compulsory school attend-
ance law in effect. See id. "In most states, it is a misdemeanor for a parent or
guardian of a child between the ages of six... and usually eighteen.., to fail to
see that the child regularly attends school." Id. In some states, parents are subject
to charge for contributing to the delinquency of a minor if they fail to ensure that
their children attend school on a regular basis. See id. (citations omitted). All
states also have laws requiring school attendance for a minimum number of years.
See id.
30. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373 (1971).
31. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972).
32. See id. at 569 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554
(1921); Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Ewing
v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)).
33. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70; see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379; Bell, 402 U.S. at
542.
34. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
136
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"the theme that 'due process of law signifies a right to be heard
in one's defense' has continually recurred" in the Court's deci-
sions.35 The Boddie Court traced this concept back to the nine-
teenth century, in cases such as Windsor v. McVeigh 36 and
Hovey v. Elliott,3 7 in which the Court rooted concepts such as
"wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he
may defend,"38 and "due process of law signifies a right to be
heard in one's defense."39
In addition to some type of hearing, a line of fundamental
cases also holds that notice is an essential element to proce-
dural due process. 40 For example, Mullane v. Hanover Trust
Co.41 established the standard that "[mlany controversies have
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they re-
quire notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case."42 This standard has been utilized in a
number of cases to mean that a person is entitled to notice
before any hearing takes place, giving the person the opportu-
nity to contest the state action. 43
"Minimum due process," therefore, has evolved to mean
that notice and an opportunity to be heard should be provided
whenever a property interest is deprived." The Supreme
Court, when determining what procedures will satisfy due pro-
cess, has applied varying procedures to different cases depend-
ing upon the interest involved in the particular case.45 As
35. Id. at 377.
36. 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
37. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
38. Windsor, 93 U.S. at 277.
39. Hovey, 167 U.S. at 417.
40. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
41. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
42. Id. at 313.
43. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1950) (citing Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (The right to a hearing "has little reality or
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to ... contest." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314)); see also Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 578.
45. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
1999]
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stated by the Court in Bell v. Burson,46 "[a] procedural rule that
may satisfy procedural due process in one context may not nec-
essarily satisfy procedural due process in every case."47 There-
fore, this Comment will examine the due process procedures
that have been required by the Supreme Court when school at-
tendance has been prohibited by the state through suspension
or expulsion.
2. Students' Procedural Due Process Rights in the
Context of Suspension and Expulsion
Although not characterized as a fundamental right, there
are some ramifications for labeling public school education, pro-
vided by the state, as a property interest. As described, prop-
erty interests in general allow access to procedural due process
before deprivation of those interests. 48
Of course, students are not entitled to attend school if they
are in violation of the order and discipline required in the public
school system.49 Bringing a weapon to school, which is conduct
in direct contravention with order and safety in school, has been
viewed by courts as an appropriate time for school authorities to
discipline children and withhold attendance privileges through
suspension and expulsion. 50 The rule of law is that school offi-
cials have broad authority to "'withdraw' an individual's right
to receive a free public education based upon that individual's
misconduct," when necessary to maintain order and discipline
and "where there exists fundamentally fair procedures to deter-
mine whether the misconduct has occurred."51
A school board's decision to suspend or expel a student will
not generally be overruled unless it is shown that the school
46. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
47. Id. at 40.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 30-47.
49. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 29, § 24.04 (citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)).
50. See id. at § 24.10 (citing Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Oxford Mun. Sep-
arate Sch Dist., 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980)); but see Washington v. Smith, 618
N.E.2d 561 (Ill. App. 1993) (expelling a student for bringing an ice pick to school to
return the pick to another student who had left it at her house the previous night,
under circumstances where the student did not exhibit, brandish, or otherwise
threaten anyone with it, was an abuse of discretion).
51. Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 517 A.2d 703, 704 (Del. Super. 1986), cited
in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 29, § 24.11 n.194.
138 [Vol. 20:131
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board acted in an "unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capri-
cious, [or] unreasonable" manner, or in a manner "unsupported
by a preponderance of the evidence."52 Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court held in Goss v. Lopez53 that students
must receive minimum due process before short-term
suspension. 54
In Goss, it was held that suspension or expulsion deprives a
student so completely of his or her property interest to attend
school, and has such great potential for negative impact upon
the child both when receiving the punishment and later in life,
that such punishment can only be imposed if accompanied by
the procedural safeguards guaranteed by minimum due
process .55
In the 1970's, nine students instituted a 42 U.S.C. § 198356
action against the Columbus Board of Education and various
administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System,
claiming that "he or she had been suspended from public school
for up to ten days without a hearing," pursuant to a state stat-
ute.57 The claim centered around the argument that the state
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed school officials
to deprive the plaintiffs of equal access to education without a
hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58 All of the
plaintiffs had been suspended as a result of "widespread stu-
dent unrest" in the spring of 1971, presumably surrounding the
52. LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 29, § 24.11 (citing Board of Ed. of
Rogers, Ark. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966 (1982), reh'g denied 458 U.S. 1132
(1982)).
53. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
54. See id. at 583 (holding that students facing temporary suspension from
public school were entitled to due process, including notice and an opportunity to
present his or her version of the incident to authorities prior to the suspension).
55. See id.; see also LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 29, at § 24.11 (ci-
tations omitted).
56. A § 1983 action is a claim that "every person who, under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ... 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (West 1994).
57. Goss, 419 U.S. at 568; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Anderson
1996).
58. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 568-69; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1999] 139
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Vietnam War.59 Each plaintiff had been suspended with some
informal notice, but without a hearing.60
The Court first stated the proposition that had by then be-
come the law, that access to education is a property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though a "right
to education" was not specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion.61 The Court reasoned that, because Ohio had provided for
public, compulsory education through state statute, the state
had created a property interest, which vested to those students
attending public school. 62 As a result, their property interest in
attending school could not be deprived without adherence to
procedural due process.63
The Court then considered what procedural due process
was due to a student when a school imposed suspension from
school. 64 When examining which procedures were required
when suspending a student, the Court considered the following:
(1) the nature of the deprivation 65 and the interest of the stu-
dent in equal access to education;66 (2) the interest of the school
district in avoiding pre-suspension procedures 67 as well as the
value of any possible additional procedures;6 and (3) the risk
involved for the child in being erroneously suspended. 69 In con-
sidering the nature of the deprivation, the Court recognized
that, although the ten day suspensions involved in these cases
were for relatively short periods of time, each suspension repre-
sented "a serious event in the life of the suspended child."70 The
Court stated that "[t]he student's interest is to avoid unfair or
mistaken exclusion from the educational process .... The Due
Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly
imposed, but it disserves both his interest and the interest of
59. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 569.
60. See id. at 569 n.3, 570-71.
61. See id. at 572-73; see also DAvis & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 63.
62. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-73.
63. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74 (citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3313.04, 3313.48,
3313.64 (1972, Supp. 1973)).
64. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 579.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 583.
69. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
70. Id. at 576.
[Vol. 20:131
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the State if his suspension is in fact unwarranted." 71 The court
also recognized the competing interest of a school district in
making its own rules, which could be adjusted for the particular
cases of which only the school officials and students themselves
could have first-hand knowledge. 72
The risk of erroneous deprivation was high due to the fact
that "[d]isciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good
faith, frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the
controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge
are often disputed."73 However, the "prospect of imposing elabo-
rate hearing requirements in every suspension case [was]
viewed with great concern," because the Court viewed school
systems as "vast and complex," and recognized that suspension,
unfortunately, was a frequent occasion, sometimes calling for
immediate, strict action.74 To impose more formal hearings for
the "countless" short-term suspensions may "overwhelm admin-
istrative facilities" and "cost more than it would save in educa-
tional effectiveness." 7
The Court, therefore, turned to the minimum standards of
due process, which traditionally afforded notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard, as deemed appropriate by the facts of each
case. 76 These minimum standards struck a balance between
the need of the student to avoid arbitrary deprivation and the
school district's need to retain flexibility over the process. 77 For
example, the opportunity to be heard could be an "informal give
and take" with the student if the school officials deemed that to
be sufficient to hear the student's point of view. 78 The Court did
not foresee difficulties in simple notice and hearing require-
ments, but found that the requirements were "if anything, less
71. Id. at 579.
72. See id. at 577-78.
73. Id. at 580.
74. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
75. Id. at 583.
76. See id. at 578-79 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950), "deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded
by notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.");
see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) ("fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard").
77. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 578-79.
78. See id. at 579.
1999] 141
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than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself
in order to avoid unfair suspensions."79
The Court then very clearly limited its holding:
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves
solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer sus-
pensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or
permanently, may require more formal procedures.80
In sum, as demonstrated by San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez"' and Goss v. Lopez,8 2 a student's
interest in attending school is a cognizable property interest
which must be protected by procedural process before being lim-
ited or denied. No procedures have been specifically outlined
for cases of long-term suspension or expulsion. However, mini-
mum due process, consisting of notice and an opportunity to be
heard, is required before suspension of a student for 10 days or
less.8 3 In Goss, the United States Supreme Court indicated that
longer suspensions and expulsions "may require more formal
procedures."8 4
3. Goldberg v. Kelly: Formal Due Process Procedures
Although the Supreme Court has not decided what "more
formal" procedures should be utilized when expelling or sus-
pending a student for a period of longer than 10 days, some gui-
dance is present in the Supreme Court decision of Goldberg v.
Kelly.8 5 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court clarified the context in
which the maximum amount of procedural due process was
owed, and what protections constituted this level of procedural
due process.8 6
In Goldberg, recipients of public assistance challenged the
termination of their welfare benefits without pre-termination
hearings.8 7 The Court found that the property interest in wel-
79. Id. at 583.
80. Id. at 584.
81. 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
83. See id. at 584.
84. Id.
85. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
86. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, CASES AND
NOTES, 380 (3d ed. West Publishing Co., 1997).
87. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255.
142 [Vol. 20:131
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fare benefits inured from the federal program of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, and the state-enacted New York
State Home Relief program.88 The Court considered the com-
peting interests of the recipients in continued benefits, and the
state in retaining flexibility in termination without extensive
procedures.8 9 The imperative interest of the recipient was the
dependence upon the benefits in question for "the very means
by which to live while he [or she] waits."90
The competing governmental interests, "conserving fiscal
and administrative resources," were found to fall short of over-
riding the interests of the welfare recipient.91 The Court quoted
the district court, stating: "[tihe stakes are simply too high for
the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irri-
table misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid with-
out giving the recipient a chance ... to be fully informed of the
case against him so that he may contest its basis and produce
evidence in rebuttal."92
Therefore, the Goldberg Court held that, where the recipi-
ent of a property interest can show an overriding interest in re-
taining the benefit of that property interest, and the risk
involved in depriving this property interest is great, a pre-ter-
mination hearing, as opposed to a hearing provided only after
termination of welfare benefits, was found to be required. 93 The
welfare recipients were entitled to the following procedures: (1)
a "fair hearing," designed "to produce an initial determination
of the validity of the ... grounds for discontinuance ... in order
to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his
benefits;"94 and (2) "the opportunity to be heard," 95 which was
held to include a hearing "at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner,"96 "timely and adequate notice detailing the rea-
88. See id. at 261; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. IV); N.Y. So-
CIAL WELFARE LAw §§ 343-362 (McKinney 1966).
89. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-66.
90. Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 265.
92. Id. at 266 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
93. See id. at 266.
94. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 (citing Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
95. Id. at 267 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
96. Id. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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sons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to
defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
his own arguments and evidence orally."97
4. The Interpretation of Goss v. Lopez and the Use of
Formal Due Process Procedures in the Education
Context
Cases subsequent to Goss98 have not been consistent in the
standard applicable to long-term suspensions and expulsions. 99
Some cases have required formal procedures, akin to those im-
posed by Goldberg v. Kelly,100 for long-term suspensions and ex-
pulsions. 1 1 Other cases have only applied minimum due
process, despite the Supreme Court's dicta in Goss stating that
more formal procedures may apply to suspensions for more than
ten days and expulsions. 10 2
Yarber v. McHenry0 3 involved a high school student who
was denied a semester of credits for violation of the attendance
policy. 10 4 The Missouri Supreme Court found that Yarber had a
property interest in his education under Goss, which attached
because Missouri statutes mandated "the establishment of
schools," and provided for compulsory education. 10 5 When ap-
plying Goss, the Missouri Supreme Court considered that when,
as in Goss, a short-term, or de minimis, deprivation was in-
volved, the student had the right to "notice and the opportunity
97. Id. at 267-68.
98. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that a student's property interest in attend-
ing school could not be deprived without adherence to procedural due process).
99. Compare State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1995)
(holding that a high school student denied a semester of credits for violation of the
attendance policy was entitled to a hearing), with Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch.
Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a student did not have right to
confront the two witnesses who implicated him in a drug violation because he was
only entitled to minimum due process).
100. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. See, e.g., Wood v. Henry Co. Public Sch., 495 S.E.2d 255 (Va. 1998);
Yarber, 915 S.W.2d at 325; United Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gonzalez, 911 S.W.2d 118
(Ct. App. Tx. 1995).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 856 F. Supp. 438
(Mass. 1995); Newsome, 842 F.2d 920.
103. 915 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1995).
104. See id. at 326.
105. Id. at 328 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 160.051, 167.031 (1986)).
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to be heard."106 However, in accordance with the wording of
Goss, "where the discipline is more than de minimis, a hearing
affording more than the informal proceeding in Goss may be re-
quired."10 7 The court found that the penalty of a denial of a se-
mester's worth of credits, was "in no way de minimis."08
Therefore, the court held that a hearing, instead of mere notice
and an "informal give-and-take between student and disciplina-
rian," were due to the plaintiff Yarber. 0 9 This case did not elab-
orate on the additional procedures that were due, since the
limited issue concerned whether this was a "contested case," re-
quiring a hearing for venue purposes." 0
Yarber also considered the denial of credits in light of an-
other U.S. Supreme Court case, Board of Curators of the Uni-
versity of Missouri v. Horowitz,"' which supported its decision
to provide a hearing to the high school student. Horowitz was
decided after Goss, and added a qualification to the procedural
due process analysis." 2 In Horowitz, a former medical student
challenged her expulsion, which was based upon poor clinical
performance. 1 3 She brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,"14
claiming that her constitutional right to procedural due process
had been infringed, because she had not received a hearing." 5
She had received notice that her performance was below par,
but was not given the opportunity to be heard before she was
expelled. 16 The Court upheld the administration's actions as
constitutional, due to the extensive nature of the evaluation
process that the school performed before expulsion. 1 7
In considering Goss, the Horowitz Court emphasized that
the Goss decision had valued the state's interest in allowing the
school administration to remain flexible in its handling of indi-
106. Yarber, 915 S.W.2d at 328.
107. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-84 (1975)).
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-84 (1975)).
110. See id. at 327.
111. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
112. See DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 121-22.
113. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79.
114. See supra note 56.
115. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 85.
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vidual disciplinary matters. 118 The Court, therefore, held in
Horowitz that the need for flexibility justified "far less stringent
procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal,"
as opposed to a disciplinary dismissal. 119
In light of Horowitz, the Missouri Supreme Court in Yarber
analyzed whether the absenteeism by Yarber constituted aca-
demic or disciplinary action when determining the level of pro-
cedural due process. 120 As the Yarber court recognized, "if [the
punishment is] disciplinary in nature, then a hearing is re-
quired .... On the other hand, if the nature of the attendance
policy is academic, then a hearing is not required . "...",121 The
Missouri Supreme Court found that, although the attendance
policy had some academic aspects, it was essentially designed to
punish poor attendance, and was therefore a disciplinary ac-
tion, requiring a hearing. 122
Some cases, unlike Yarber, have applied the Goss "mini-
mum due process" standard for procedural due process to long-
term suspensions and expulsions, ignoring the fact that Goss'
holding is limited to short-term suspensions only. 123 For exam-
ple, in Newsome v. Batavia Local School District,124 a high
school student was expelled for "possessing and offering a mari-
juana cigarette for sale on high school property."125 Newsome
was originally suspended pursuant to a preliminary suspension
hearing, at which school officials refused to disclose the identity
of two individuals who had originally made the charges. 126 The
hearing was discontinued, but before it could be resumed,
school officials informed Newsome that he was expelled for the
rest of the semester.127
When Newsome appealed the decision to the Batavia
School Board, he was given a hearing and had the opportunity
118. See id. at 86.
119. Id.
120. See Yarber, 915 S.W.2d at 328.
121. Id. at 329.
122. See id.
123. See cases cited supra note 102.
124. 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988).
125. Id. at 921.
126. See id.
127. See id.
146 [Vol. 20:131
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/7
WEAPONS VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
to be represented by counsel. 128 Again, the school officials, stat-
ing that they rested their decision to expel Newsome solely
upon the statements of two witnesses, refused to produce the
witnesses against Newsome or to identify them.129 The school
board affirmed the expulsion in closed deliberations, which the
school principal and superintendent attended but which New-
some and his attorney were forbidden to attend.' 30
The Sixth Circuit held that Newsome's procedural due pro-
cess rights had not been denied by the refusal to allow the cross-
examination of the witnesses against him, or by the closed de-
liberations.' 3 ' In so holding, the court reasoned, "[wihile Goss
specifically limited itself to 'the short suspension, not exceeding
ten days, it nevertheless establishes the minimum require-
ments for long-term expulsions as well.""' 32
Thus, the only direction from the Supreme Court regarding
disciplinary expulsions follows from dicta contained in Goss v.
Lopez, 133 that procedures more formal than minimum due pro-
cess may be required, and a possible interpretation of Board of
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 34 that
although academic dismissals do not warrant a hearing, disci-
plinary expulsions probably do.' 35 The lack of a Supreme Court
decision on point has led to varying results regarding the level
of due process necessary before long-term suspensions and ex-
pulsions, either providing "barebones" minimum due process, or
requiring formal procedures such as a hearing and the presen-
tation of witnesses.
C. Weapons Violence in Schools
Since 1996, at least 27 people have died and dozens have
been wounded in school shootings nationwide. 136 The Violence
128. See id.
129. See 842 F.2d at 922.
130. See id. at 922-24.
131. See id. at 925.
132. Id. at 926 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
133. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
134. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
135. See Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Mo. 1995).
136. See Schmidt, supra note 2, at Al; see also Victoria Benning, Note, Seen as
Threat, Has Student in Trouble, WASH. POST, June 2, 1998, at BOl.
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Institute of New Jersey at the University of Medicine and Den-
tistry released a 1996 study, which reported that:
[Approximately eight] percent of New Jersey high school pupils
said they had taken a weapon to school in the last 30 days. About
four percent of high school students reported they stayed out of
school at least one day in the past 30 days because they felt
threatened, and 6.6 percent said they had been threatened or in-
jured with a weapon on school property at least once during the
year. 137
The most unsettling incidents of school gun violence have
been chillingly similar. Their description is crucial to develop-
ing an understanding of the type of behavior that should be
targeted by the law and eliminated altogether. The profile has
been described as follows: "A deeply troubled student. An un-
resolved grievance, real or imagined. No clue how to handle the
anger or pain. A breakdown or rejection of parental supervi-
sion. Access to guns." 138 Most of the recent incidents of weap-
ons violence in schools have involved multiple-victim school
shootings by white teenagers in rural communities or small
towns. 139 The most dangerous and destructive students have fit
this profile: they have been "depressed boy[s] of above-average
intelligence, who suffered an inferiority complex and [were] en-
thralled by violent images from film or television." 140
137. Jean Rimbach & John Mooney, Whitman Unveils Plan to Cut School Vio-
lence, THE RECORD, N. N. J., Sept. 4, 1998, at A3.
138. Matthew Hay Brown et al., Why Do Kids Kill? Contrary to Perceptions,
School Violence is Not Rising. But Amid a Shocking Spate of Multiple Schoolyard
Killings, a Profile of Child Killers is Emerging, HARTFORD COURANT, March 26,
1998, at Al.
139. See id.
140. Randall Sullivan, A Boy's Life, Part 2, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 1, 1998, at
46, 49; see also Anatomy of a Massacre (Columbine High School Shootings), supra
note 1 (before the alleged rampage at Columbine High School, the two accused
gunmen, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold "became 'obsessed' with the violent game
Doom-an interactive game in which the players try to rack up the most kills-
and played it every afternoon."); Lynne Lamberg, Preventing School Violence: No
Easy Answers, Aug. 5, 1998, 1998 JAMA 404 (noting troubled students are isolated
when other children fail to relate to their fascination with violence; the typical
offender is a male without many friends to challenge his behavior, who act out to
make people pay attention to him). Recognizing the unorthodox nature of citing
ROLLING STONE in a law review article, I must state that the investigative report-
ing of ROLLING STONE's two-part analysis of teenage weapons violence was almost
unparalleled by other sources.
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While the demographics of multiple-victim school shootings
have common threads, no solitary factor can explain this com-
plex and multi-faceted phenomenon. 4 1 Rural settings, such as
Springfield, Oregon, where 17-year-old Kip Kinkle recently pled
guilty to shooting two of his classmates dead and injuring doz-
ens of others and stands charged of killing his parents, 142 are
common settings for multiple-victim gun violence. 4 3 A 1993
141. See generally Trina Menden Anglin, Violent and Aggressive Behavior, in
PRIMARY PEDIATRIC CARE 839 (3d ed., Mosby-Year Book, Inc., 1997).
142. See The Associated Press, School Shootings List, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEW-
SWIRES, Sept. 24, 1999, at 1, available in 9/24/99 APWIRES 16:55:00; Randall Sul-
livan, A Boy's Life, Part 1, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 1, 1998, at 46, 50.
143. Barry Loukaitis, who was 14 when committing multiple shootings in
school, was recently sentenced to life in prison for the deaths of two students and a
teacher on February 2, 1996 during an algebra class in the small farm town of
Moses Lake, Washington. See Family of Moses Lake Victim Refiles Suit Against
Killer's Family, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 11, 1999, at B2. Evan Ramsey, now
18, was sentenced to 210 years in prison for his shooting rampage on February 19,
1997, when he was only 16, in Bethel, Alaska. He received 99 years each for the
deaths of a student and principal, and 12 years for attempted murder and assault.
See News Highlights, CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 4, 1998, at 2A. Eighteen-year-old
Luke Woodham is currently serving three life sentences for stabbing his mother to
death and killing two students in a shooting spree on October 1, 1997, in Pearl,
Mississippi, when he was only 16, during which eight others were injured. See The
Associated Press, Boyette Trial Delayed Again, AsSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES,
Sept. 21, 1999, at 1, available in 9/21/99 APWIRES 12:40:00; Gina Holland, Vio-
lence Solutions Sought, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 24, 1999, at 1, avail-
able in 8/24/99 APWIRES 02:12:00; Peal High Defendant Wants New Trial Judge,
THE COMMERICAL APPEAL, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9. Michael Carneal recently plead
guilty but mentally ill to murder and is serving a life sentence for opening fire on a
prayer group at Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucy, on December 1,
1997, killing three and wounding five students, in 1997, when he was only 14 years
old. See The Associated Press, School Shootings List, supra note 142, at 1; see also
The Associated Press, Carneal Thought it Would be 'Neat' to Act Out Part of Movie,
Friend Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 5, 1999, available in 9/5/99 APWIRES
22:02:00; see also Stacey Burns, Legislature 1999: Bill Would Have State Study Tie
Between Games, Violence, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 1999, at All. In 1997, in
the small town of Stamps, Arkansas, a 14-year-old boy was arrested for allegedly
instituting a sniper attack that wounded two students. See Ellen O'Brien & Kevin
Wishard, Growing Up With Guns: Everyone Has Answers but Few Solutions for
Teen Violence, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 31, 1998, at H1. On March 24,
1998, another grisly episode occurred in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Two boys, Mitchell
Johnson, 13, and Andrew Golden, 11, pulled a fire alarm in a middle school and
shot those who filed out onto the playground. See id. The boys were convicted of
murdering four students and wounding ten others. See id.; see also The Associated
Press, School Shootings List, supra note 142, at 1; Randall Sullivan, supra note
140, at 46, 49. "The day after the Jonesboro killings, a four-year-old boy arrived at
his Cleveland childcare center with a loaded gun hidden in his clothing. On the
same day, a 13-year-old [attempted] to murder his principal with a semiautomatic
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study revealed that more than half of the seventh to twelfth
grade boys questioned in 38 rural Texas school districts re-
ported carrying a knife to school. 44 This number is twice the
national average. 45 This same study revealed that "eighteen
percent of 15 to 17-year-old boys reported carrying a handgun to
school," which is a number seven times the national average. 46
In the 12 months preceding the survey, 16% of the students who
admitted that they carried a weapon to school had been robbed,
37% had been threatened, and 15% had been physically at-
tacked while at school. 147 "Most [of these students] reported
[that] carrying a gun to school [was] for protection or with the
intent to shoot an aggressor." 48 Children in rural areas have a
"far readier access to guns,"149 even more access than "black ur-
ban youths, according to a 1996 poll by Louis Harris &
Associates." 50
Another common thread that emerges is that the boys ac-
cused of committing the highly publicized rural multi-victim
school shootings were proclaimed to be clinically depressed. 151
weapon in Daly City, California. A few days later, [two groups of] teenagers in two
automobiles opened fire on each other in front of a high school in Nashville."
Michael Fickes, Guns, Knives and Schools, 37 SCH. PLAN. AND MGMT., 5, 20 (1998).
Fortunately, no one was hurt in the Nashville drive-by. See id. On the last day of
March 1998, two 14-year-olds were arrested in Baltimore for arranging a murder-
for-hire plot, in which one offered the other $100 to kill a 16-year-old. See id. On
April 24, 1998, a science teacher was shot and died at an eighth-grade dance in
Edinboro, Pennsylvania. Andrew Hurst, 14, awaits trial. See School Shootings
List, supra note 142, at 1. On May 19, 1998, 18-year-old Jacob Davis allegedly shot
and killed a classmate in a parking lot at his high school in Fayetteville, Tennes-
see. See id. On May 21, 1998, 25 people were hurt and two teens were killed in a
high school in Springfield, Oregon, at the hands of 15-year-old Kip Kinkel. Kinkel
pled guilty to murder and attempted murder, and is accused of killing his parents
the day before the shooting. See id. On April 10, 1999, 15 lives ended and 23
students were wounded at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, at the
hands of two student gunmen, Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 17, who went on
a vicious shooting spree and then killed themselves. See Anatomy of a Massacre
(Columbine High School Shootings), supra note 1, at 1.
144. See Kathleen J. Cirillo et al., School Violence: Prevalence and Interven-
tion Strategies for At-Risk Adolescents, ADOLESCENCE, July 1, 1998, at 1, available
in 1998 WL 22004851.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Kathleen J. Cirillo et al., supra note 144.
149. Matthew Hay Brown et al., supra note 138, at Al.
150. Id.
151. See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 46, 49.
150
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The incidence of depression and suicide has greatly risen among
young people. Reliable studies have shown that 30-35% of male
adolescents and 50% of female adolescents report symptoms of
depression, including suicidal ideation.152
The psychiatrist who examined 14-year-old Barry
Loukaitis, who allegedly shot his math teacher and two class-
mates in February 1996,153 stated: "one of the things that we're
seeing in the population at large is that all the mood disorders
are happening earlier and earlier."154 Kip Kinkle, the 17-year-
old boy who recently pled guilty to murder in the Springfield,
Oregon shootings, 55 was treated with Prozac before the time of
his alleged rampage. 56 "Studies have shown that people taking
Prozac tend to be less aggressive and irritable... [b]ut the issue
[which would have been a central one] at Kip Kinkel's criminal
trial [would have been] whether people who go off Prozac be-
come even more irritable and aggressive than they were prior to
taking the drug."15 7
The American Psychological Association has identified four
factors in its "Violence and Youth" report that contribute to ju-
venile violence: (1) early involvement with drugs and alcohol;
(2) easy access to weapons, especially handguns; (3) association
with anti-social, deviant peer groups; 58 and (4) pervasive expo-
sure to violence in the media. 59 In turn, other common reasons
152. See L. MUFSON ET AL., INTERPERSONAL PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR DEPRESSED
ADOLESCENTS (1993), cited in Ake Mattsson & John M. Diamond, Mood Disorders
in Children and Adolescents, in PRIMARY PEDIATRIC CARE, 819 (3d ed. Mosby-Year
Book, Inc. 1997).
153. See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 49.
154. Id. at 50.
155. See School Shootings List, supra note 142, at 1; see generally Sullivan,
supra note 142, at 76.
156. See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 46, 50.
157. Id.
158. For example, adult charges were brought against a number of students
for allegedly master-minding the school shooting in Jackson, Mississippi by gun-
man Michael Woodham, which left his mother and two students dead. The other
students charged were part of"a cult-like group linked to the killings." See Boyette
Trial Delayed Again, supra note 143.
159. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION COMM. ON VIOLENCE AND
YOUTH, REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND YOUTH (1993); see also Carneal Thought it Would
be 'Neat' to Act Out Part of Movie, Friend Says, supra note 143 ("About a year
before opening fire on a high school prayer group, Michael Carneal told a friend it
'would be neat' to act out part of a movie in which a youngster dreams about shoot-
ing fellow students . . . ."). The families of the three girls killed when Michael
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attributed to teenage weapons violence are: (1) the breakdown
of the family unit;160 and (2) the exposure of children to violence
and mature subject matter at increasingly earlier ages. 161
The ease and extent of access to weapons that children en-
joy is definitely a common phenomenon in the highly publicized
accounts of student weapons violence. 62 This may be attributa-
ble to a lax or misguided parental attitude towards guns. For
example, as Kip Kinkle became fixated on guns by perusing
them on the Internet and in gun magazines, his father, who had
never been a gun owner and had in fact despised them, never-
theless "agreed to buy Kip a .22 rifle.., for Christmas." 63 Kip's
father, Bill Kinkle, "had become convinced [that] Kip would find
some other way to get a gun . . .and was concerned that his
refusal to be involved might add the allure of forbidden fruit to
Kip's desire for a weapon." 64
Bill Kinkle's fear that his son would find some way to own a
gun demonstrates the other reality of weapons access to chil-
dren: the teenage generation's sophistication in trafficking
Carneal, 14, aimed a shooting spree at a prayer group in Paducah, Kentucky, have
brought suit against 25 companies alleging that the entertainment industry moti-
vated the attack. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Digest Briefs, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, July 20, 1999, available in 7/20/99 APWIRES 18:16:00.
160. A study done in September, 1997 revealed that "parent-family connected-
ness" had an impact upon "emotional distress for both younger and older adoles-
cents;" for example, "[tihe presence of parents at key times during the day (at
waking, after school, at dinner, and at bedtime), shared activities with parents,
and high parental expectations for their child's school achievement were.. . mod-
erately protective against emotional distress for both younger and older adoles-
cents." Michael D. Resnick et al., Protecting Adolescents from Harm: Findings from
the National Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health, 278 JAMA 823, Sept. 10,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13337915.
161. See Holland, supra note 143, at 1. (School counselor Donna Barefoot com-
mented on the great number of students she treats on the elementary school level
who come to her with complex issues such as divorce and domestic violence. "I tell
them[:] 'you have big people problems and you're only five years old.'"); see gener-
ally Paul M. Bogos, "Expelled, No Excuses, No Exceptions."--Michigan's Zero-Tol-
erance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.LA. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DEW.
MERCY L. REV. 357 (1997) (citing CARL S. TAYLOR, DANGEROUS SOCIETY (1990));
Matthew Robinson, When Children Commit Crimes, Jump in Violence Worries Po-
lice, Policy-Makers, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 4, 1995, at Al; Michael Cas-
serly, Discipline and Demographics, The Problem is Not Just the Kids, EDUC. WK.,
Jan. 24, 1996, at 40.
162. See Brown et al., supra note 138, at Al.
163. See Sullivan, supra note 142, at 84-85.
164. Id. at 85.
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weapons. 165 Incredibly, children are buying guns from each
other in school. 166 On the day that Kip Kinkle allegedly com-
mitted his murders, he had been on suspension along with an-
other boy for alleged possession and sale of a stolen handgun.167
The other boy had allegedly telephoned Kip, telling him to bring
money to school for a "surprise," which turned out to be "a .32-
caliber pistol,.., loaded with a nine-round clip," which had al-
legedly been stolen from another friend's father.168
This sort of access is characteristic of the weapons violence
occurring nationwide. For example, the children who were con-
victed of committing the Jonesboro, Arkansas shootings, at the
incredibly young ages of 11 and 13, had access and possession
of: "three high-powered hunting rifles, seven handguns, two
crossbows, a machete, eight knives and a huge cache of ammu-
nition" at the time of the alleged incident. 169 This sort of access,
coupled with "the fact that youths have trouble resolving dis-
putes maturely" can easily result in deadly confrontations.' 70
The alternative to analyzing each component of school vio-
lence is to see the problem as one, complex, multi-faceted whole.
Dr. Carl Bell, president and CEO of the Community Mental
Health Council in Chicago, recently stated: "you can't blame it
on the school, you can't blame it on the family, the breakdown of
religion or the availability of guns. It is not that simple. It is
usually a combination of things. Behavior is mul-
tidetermined."' 7' Inherent in this gestalt analysis is the most
frightening aspect of studying the cause of school violence:
"some children are very, very psychopathic .... Some kids are
young predators." 172 As social scientist Charles Patrick Ewing
described, "these 'crazy murders'.., have no obvious motive." 73
165. See, e.g., R. Michael Anderson, Janitor Charged in Sale of Gun to Stu-
dent, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, March 18, 1998, at 1.
166. See, e.g., Kathy Ostrander, Milton Teen Charged on Gun, Drug Counts,
WISCONSIN STATE J., Dec. 22, 1998, at lB.
167. Sullivan, supra note 142, at 78.
168. Id.
169. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 50; see also Fickes, supra note 143, at 20.
170. Robinson, supra note 161, at Al.
171. Clarence Waldron, Why Are So Many Children Committing Murders?,
JET MAG., June 8, 1998, at 14.
172. Id.
173. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 50.
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Children likely to kill can be criminally psychotic, which, in
part, means that they either have no way to comprehend conse-
quences, or on some psychological level are so self-destructive
that punishment will not deter them.174 For example, Barry
Loukaitis, the 14-year-old honor student convicted of shooting
his math teacher and two classmates, made a disturbing com-
ment demonstrating a high level of psychotic behavior. 175
Standing over one of his victims who had been sitting in math
class he asked, "Sure beats algebra, doesn't it?"176
This sort of attitude is disturbing because it is callous and
reckless about causing other people's suffering. These traits are
textbook indications of psychopathy, which is characterized as
"prominent guiltlessness (defective conscience) and loveless-
ness, [the] (incapacity for loyalty to others)." 77 A psychopathic
child operates with a "disregard for the feelings and rights of
others and an inability or unwillingness to control their own be-
havior... [F]uture psychopaths grow from childhood into ado-
lescence loving no one and guided by an external morality in
which acceptable behavior is whatever they can get away
with.' 78
D. School Responses to Weapons Violence
In recent years, schools have taken action, devising tactics
against school violence beyond the traditional reprimand in the
principal's office, or home suspension. New Jersey Passaic High
School officials are focusing on prevention by instituting their
own anti-violence programs. 79 For example, the district has in-
stituted peer-mediation and leadership programs and it plans
to create a new group to present anti-violence assemblies. 80
174. See Irving B. Weiner, Juvenile Delinquency, in PRIMARY PEDIATRIC CARE,
815-16 (3d ed. Mosby-Year Book, Inc., 1997) ("The illegal behavior of charactero-
logical delinquents reflects a basically asocial personality orientation. These
young people manifest many features of what is commonly termed psychopathy.").
Id.
175. See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 49.
176. Id.
177. Weiner, supra note 174, at 815-16.
178. Weiner, supra note 174, at 816 (citing L.J. Deutsch and M.T. Erickson,
Early Life Events as Discriminators of Socialized and Undersocialized Delin-
quents, 17 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 541 (1989)).
179. See Rimbach & Mooney, supra note 137, at A3.
180. See id.
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Some school administrators have been receptive to prevent-
ative measures such as state action instituting police presence
in schools. Officials from Paterson High School in New Jersey,
for example, have reported beneficial effects of police presence
in school.' 8 ' The police officers assigned to Paterson High
School have provided "training in school violence prevention,
conflict mediation, counseling, sexual harassment, and how to
handle secret tips from students."1 8 2
Other school officials hesitate to institute the presence of
police and metal detectors, and instead choose to focus on de-
manding accountability from the students. 8 3 These school dis-
tricts have depended solely upon their strict expulsion
policies.'l 4 For example, the Superintendent in the Bethlehem
Area School District in Pennsylvania recently expressed his
view that he sees metal detectors as a last resort.8 5 Instead,
the superintendent wants to use state grants to bolster the dis-
trict's Second Chance Academy, an alternative program for
troubled youths who have been suspended or expelled for bad
behavior. 8 6 This district has also "expelled two eighth-graders
for making death threats against their teachers on the In-
ternet."18 7 In 1997, a student in New Milford, New Jersey, was
reported to the police for threatening a teacher. 88 The New
Milford superintendent stated: "the student's mother was upset,
but we told her we had no choice, period .... Any threat is
taken seriously. We can't let anything go by."18 9
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See Kathleen Parrish & Christian D. Berg, Pennsylvania Bill Seeks Mil-
lions to Fight School Violence: State Representative Julie Harhart will Introduce
the Law With Attorney General's Backing, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, SEPT. 15,
1998, at Al.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. The Second Chance Academy is a proposed alternate program for
troubled students between the ages of 10 and 17. If successful, this academy will
provide counseling and academic programs for a selected 100 troubled students,
while suspended or expelled. See Gail Scudder, School Symposium Coordinates
the Taming of Unruly Students: Lehigh Valley Leaders Want Help to Protect Good
Students from Disrupters, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, May 29, 1998, at B1.
187. Parrish & Berg, supra note 183, at Al.
188. See Rimbach & Mooney, supra note 137, at A3.
189. Id.
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In New Mexico, the Belen Board of Education "tightened
restrictions against bringing guns or other weapons on campus
and expanded conditions allowing searches and seizures on
campus." 190 The policy, which already banned guns, was ex-
panded to prohibit knives, or any other item that could be used
as a weapon. 191 It also banned toy guns, toy knives, and any
explosive, including bombs, grenades and rockets. 192 The pun-
ishment for possession of any of these items is expulsion for up
to a year and automatic referral to law enforcement. 193
E. Parental Responses to Weapons Violence
In June 1998, a couple in Waukesha County, Wisconsin,
pressed charges against their 17-year-old son after he made
threats to imitate the acts that have been attributed to Kip Kin-
kle, i.e., to kill his parents and classmates. 194 The frightening
threat came after a series of behavior problems, including tem-
per displays in which he threatened on other occasions to harm
his family and classmates. 195 Other behavior representing a
cause for concern included an incident where he brought a toy
gun to school, and threatened to kill fellow football players who
had criticized his athletic ability.196
Reluctantly, his parents decided to have him jailed while
they sought treatment options. 197 The charge was disorderly
conduct and bail jumping related to a previous charge. 198 "A
court commissioner set bail at $5,000, after the parents said
they refused to take him back home until he entered inpatient
treatment." 199 The broken-hearted mother stated, "He's our son
190. Arley Sanchez, School Board Tightens Weapons, Search Policies, ALBU-
QUERQUE J., June 25, 1998, at 2. The student rights implicated by school search
and seizure policies present distinct legal issues. Such a discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it is important to recognize that tough laws may
diminish a number of students' rights.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Lisa Sink, Waukesha County Couple Press Charges Against Their
Son Over Threats: 17-year-old's Reference to Oregon School Killings Was Last
Straw, Mom Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 3, 1998, at 1.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Sink, supra note 194, at 1.
[Vol. 20:131
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/7
WEAPONS VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
and we love him,... [but] [wie just feel like [he is] at a turning
point here. I see it as a cry for help."20 0
Other parents describe similar despair and torment over
children who exhibit bizarre and dangerous behavior, but luck-
ily are able to identify and treat an underlying mental disorder
before tragedy strikes. One father described for the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette a son difficult even from birth.20 1 "As an infant,
[the father described,] he'd hold his breath until he turned blue.
We had to blow on his face to get him to breathe."20 2 As an older
child, he became highly aggressive, threatening to kill his
mother, and often harming himself, his sister, and his
mother. 20 3 The family, early on, accepted the fact that a mental
illness was to blame, and began a search for the proper medical
treatment.20 4 After treatment for attention deficit disorder
failed, and after many harrowing violent outbursts from the
child, a psychiatrist pinpointed the correct mental disorder, and
prescribed a regimen of "medication, close supervision, a strict
schedule and rules with clear rewards and consequences." 20 5
Parents of troubled children, although becoming more ad-
ept at recognizing mental illness and seeking treatment, are
discouraged. At a meeting arranged by United States Repre-
sentative Ronnie Shows, D-Miss., in response to the shooting
aimed at a student prayer group in Jackson, Mississippi, par-
ents concerned about their troubled teens spoke out.20 6 Many
expressed frustration over the state's "expensive medicines, in-
adequate treatment options and untrained educators." 20 7 One
mother of a mentally ill teen-age boy confessed that she was at
a breaking point.208 In an effort to supervise her son full time to
avoid any sort of violent behavior, she "turned down a promo-
200. Id.
201. See Sally Kalson, Beyond Control, PIrTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 10,
1998, at Al. The names of the family members were kept confidential for anonym-
ity purposes. See id.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See Kalson, supra note 201, at Al.
205. Id.
206. See Holland, supra note 143.
207. Id.
208. See id.
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tion and works nights so she can be available [to her son] in the
daytime."209
One can only imagine the experiences that families are
forced to endure living with a troubled child. According to Eliz-
abeth Kelly Scanlon, the director of the Western Pennsylvania
Coalition for Children's Advocacy, "'[siome of these families are
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,'... referring to
the same condition ascribed to soldiers returning from war."210
F. Government Responses to Weapons Violence and Zero
Tolerance Laws
Prior to 1994, federal and state legislation was not specific
with regard to student discipline, and "generally decreed it to be
a local issue. The most common law on the books was a general
requirement that local boards have in place a policy on disci-
pline, suspensions, and expulsions."211
With increasing reports and public attention regarding
weapons violence in schools, both the state and federal govern-
ments have reacted. The school officials, in tandem with law
enforcement, were the first to react. During the month of June,
1996,
a panic-driven wave of juvenile arrests and school suspensions
spread across Oregon and into adjacent states .... In Grants
Pass, [Oregon,] a 15-year-old boy was arrested for threatening to
kill two classmates .... In the town of Lebanon, [Oregon,] a 12-
year-old was suspended from school while police investigators
tried to determine what charges were appropriate for 'allegedly
making threatening remarks and machine-gun-like sounds.' In
Vancouver, Washington, a six-year-old boy was suspended from
school after another kid reported that he had bragged he was go-
ing to bring a gun to school .... At Exeter High School, in Exeter,
New Hampshire, fifty-two senior boys were disciplined for squirt-
ing underclassmen with Super Soakers during lunch.212
209. Id.
210. Kalson, supra note 201, at Al.
211. Chris Pipho, Living With Zero Tolerance, PHi DELTA KAPPAN, June 1,
1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 13658413.
212. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 48, 49.
158 [Vol. 20:131
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/7
WEAPONS VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
1. Federal, State, and Local Programs
As far back as 1978, the Safe School Study Report was pre-
pared for Congress, presenting the disturbing incidents of seri-
ous violent crime in American schools. 213 According to this
report, over a third of robberies and assaults on youth in urban
areas occurred in school and over 5,000 teachers per month
were physically assaulted in school. 214
In the 1980's the problem was still an issue of concern. For
example, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,215 a 1985 decision of the
United States Supreme Court, the Court stated that "drug use
and violent crime in the schools have become major social
problems."216
In the past five years, radio addresses and memoranda
from President Clinton have revealed that the problem is still a
serious issue today.217 In his radio address to the nation on May
23, 1998, President Clinton spoke about the rash of rural multi-
ple-victim school shootings in Kentucky, Arkansas, Mississippi
and Pennsylvania. 218 He described these events as "symptoms
of a changing culture that desensitizes our children to violence;
... where too many young people seem unable or unwilling to
take responsibility for their actions; and where all too often,
everyday conflicts are resolved not with words, but with weap-
ons, which, even when illegal to possess by children, are all too
easy to get."219
In response to these events and the more prevalent
problems he spoke of, President Clinton sponsored several cam-
paigns against school weapons violence. He initiated the Youth
213. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE
SCHOOL STUDY REP. TO THE CONGRESS (1978), cited in Julius Menacker & Richard
Mertz, State Legislative Responses to School Crime, 85 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1993).
214. See id.
215. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
216. Id. at 339.
217. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, Radio Address
Paper on New Resources to Keep Schools Safe, (Sept. 11, 1999), available in 1999
WL 706603; Radio Address of the President to the Nation, supra note 2; President
Clinton's Memorandum on Implementation of Safe School Legislation, 30 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. DOC. 2150-51 (Oct. 22, 1994).
218. See Radio Address of the President to the Nation, supra note 2.
219. Id.
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Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII),220 designed to elimi-
nate the illegal gun markets that target some of their sales to
school children by providing information and funding for the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and local police de-
partments. 221 As of May 1998, the YCGII had traced over
93,000 guns in the illegal gun trafficking market. 2
22
A directive from the President, signed in March 1997, re-
quired every federal agency to enforce a requirement that each
gun issued to federal law enforcement officers have child safety
locks. 223 In a "historic agreement, eight major gun manufactur-
ers followed the President's lead and ... voluntarily agreed to
provide child safety locking devices with all their handguns."224
In a September 1998 proclamation, President Clinton an-
nounced that in August of that year his administration had re-
leased a guide as part of the Administration's Safe and Drug-
Free Schools program, entitled "Early Warning, Timely Re-
sponse: A Guide to Safe Schools." The guide, developed by the
Secretary of Education and the Attorney General, sets out to
help schools and teachers identify dangerous students and pre-
vent violence. 225 At the same time, President Clinton also cre-
ated the School-Based Partnership grant program, which will
be used by police to work with schools and community-based
organizations to address crime in schools. 226
In the wake of the Columbine High School shootings, Presi-
dent Clinton has "called on Congress to do its part by passing
common sense gun legislation . . . [and] announced over $100
million in grants from the new Safe Schools/Healthy Students
Initiative for 54 communities to prevent and combat youth vio-
lence. An additional $17 million in COPS grants for 46 commu-
220. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-484 (1998).
221. See THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY 5/29/98, Fact Sheet on Building Safer Communities, May 29, 1998, at 3,
available in 1998 WL 274842.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See Proclamation No. 7118, 64 Fed. Reg. 49, 261 (1998); see also The
White House: Promoting School Safety, Preventing Youth Violence and Encourag-
ing Learning, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16528797 [here-
inafter Preventing Youth Violence].
226. See Preventing Youth Violence, supra note 225.
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nities to hire 147 new police officers for schools was also
released."227
Recent state government responses have included a call to
prevention, including training teachers to recognize potentially
dangerous students, and to handle those students once identi-
fied. 228 As Mike Fisher, Attorney General of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania observed, "most school officials are ill-
equipped to deal with violence." 229
In the State of New Jersey, Governor Christine Todd Whit-
man proposed a plan in September 1998 with the goal of "iden-
tify[ing] and treat[ing] troubled students before violence
occurs."230 The plan proposes to: (1) assign police officers to
some New Jersey schools; (2) distribute guidelines to teachers
about the common characteristics of troubled students, includ-
ing a "tip sheet of behavior problems" and a video series; (3)
provide $5 rebates to gun buyers who install trigger locks; (4)
create a program to help victims of youth violence; and (5)
launch a peer-based anti-violence campaign. 231
In Pennsylvania in September 1998, state Representative
Julie Harhart and Attorney General Mike Fisher announced
plans to make $80 million available for Pennsylvania schools to
buy security devices and provide training to stop crime in the
classroom. 232 "Under the plan, schools could use the funds to
buy metal detectors, hire security guards, develop violence re-
sponse plans, provide staff training, purchase instructional
materials and institute school identification programs .... "233
Bibb County in Macon, Georgia boasts a detailed program
designed to prevent teenage weapons violence and crime.234
The Chief of Police for the Bibb County Board of Education
Campus Police Department, Michael Dorn, is an expert in the
227. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Radio Address Paper on New Resources
to Keep Schools Safe 9/11199, (Sept. 13, 1999), available in 1999 WL 706603, at 1.
228. See Parrish & Berg, supra note 183, at Al.
229. Id.
230. Rimbach & Mooney, supra note 137, at A3.
231. See id.
232. See Parrish & Berg, supra note 183, at Al.
233. Id.
234. See Fickes, supra note 143, at 20 (1998).
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practical techniques of preventing weapons violence in
schools. 235
Dorn first practices "honest assessments of the potential for
violent incidents in... schools .... 'Begin by studying crime in
your community, in cooperation with the local police, . . . If
young people in your community are committing crimes with
weapons, that's an important indicator. Young people won't
say, oh, this is a school, no weapons there.'" 236 Dorn does point
out, however, that studying community crime is not a fool-proof
indicator.237 Many of the highly publicized school shootings
were such a shock because they occurred in communities with
very low incidents of weapons crime.238 Regardless of the type
of community, all schools need weapon reduction strategies; the
incidence of violent crime outside the school merely measures
the urgency.239
The strategy implemented in Bibb County consists of five
factors:
(1) a policy that defines what weapons are, prohibits students
from carrying those weapons to school, and lays out the conse-
quences for being caught with a weapon in school;
(2) constant education about these policies so that all students
know exactly what will happen if they are caught with a weapon;
(3) policies designed to make it difficult to bring a weapon to
school;
(4) weapons screening programs;
(5) consistent sanctions for students caught violating the
weapons policy. 240
2. Zero-Tolerance Laws
In 1994, President Clinton expanded the Drug-Free Schools
Act 241 into the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
Act of 1994,242 placing emphasis on violence prevention by pro-
viding fiscal support for violence and drug prevention pro-
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Fickes, supra note 143, at 20.
240. Id.
241. 20 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (1989).
242. 20 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (1994).
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grams. 243 Accompanying these Acts, President Clinton signed
into law the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.244
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 requires each state re-
ceiving federal funds to have in effect a state law requiring local
educational agencies to expel, for at least one year, any student
"who is determined to have brought a weapon to school."245 In
addition, in order to receive federal funds, schools are directed
to develop policies "requiring referral to the criminal justice or
juvenile delinquency system of any student who brings a fire-
arm or weapon to . . . school."246 The one-year expulsion is
mandatory, except that the chief administering officer of such
local education agency may modify it on a case-by-case basis.247
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994248 makes no mention or provi-
sion for procedural due process, except to make a provision for
adherence to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.249
Nationwide, "student discipline and control entered a new
era in 1994 when the federal government passed ... the Gun-
Free Schools Act.250 Beginning in 1994 and carrying on into
1995, [most] states came into compliance with the federal man-
date."251 These laws accurately track the federal law regarding
the punishment of immediate expulsion if found to be in posses-
243. See Preventing Youth Violence, supra note 225.
244. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
245. 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1).
246. 20 U.S.C. § 8922(a). The implications of this subsection of the law is be-
yond the scope of this article, which is focusing only on the issue of the one-year
expulsion. However, the solution suggested herein, to require maximum due pro-
cess in the Gun Free Schools Act, would presumably cure any deficiencies in due
process that this subsection may present.
247. See 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1); see also Preventing Youth Violence, supra note
225.
248. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
249. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq.; see 20 U.S.C. § 8923 (1994). Courts have con-
sistently held that the Gun-Free Schools Act does not permit the expulsion of
handicapped students without adherence to the procedural safeguards of the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. (1994); see
e.g., Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Ariz. 1997). This
unequal treatment poses an interesting equal protection issue, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. What is relevant to the present inquiry is that procedural due
process was additionally provided for through the Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act, but no additional provisions were made for the procedural due process
of other students.
250. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
251. Pipho, supra note 211, at 1.
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sion of a weapon in school. The most marked difference be-
tween them is the amount of procedural due process afforded.
Some provide formal due process, such as a hearing with the
right to cross-examine witnesses. Others provide for no due
process at all. The state laws enacted to comply with the Gun-
Free Schools Act 252 can be characterized as follows:
252. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
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This chart demonstrates that the Gun-Free Schools Act of
1994256 has produced laws in almost every state, consistent only
with regard to the punishment imposed. All laws require one-
year expulsion of every student who is determined to have
brought a gun to school. The lack of uniformity exists in the
procedures offered before the one-year expulsion. Some states,
such as West Virginia, offer formal procedural due process pro-
cedures, while others, such as Utah, offer no procedural due
process at all.257
III. The Implications for Law and Society of
Zero-Tolerance Laws
As described in Part I, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994258
and zero tolerance laws have yielded results, that, even the
school officials involved admit, border on the ridiculous, such as
immediate suspension for playing with plastic toys. 259 The law
enforcement and school administration hypersensitivity to stu-
dents' horseplay with water pistols is a justified, but counter-
productive, response to school weapons violence. The
justification lies in the school's overall responsibility to ensure
safety in schools, and the desire to best prevent any escalation
of violence. The counterproductive nature of this crackdown is
that it treats children who are prone to violence, and children
who mean no harm by their behavior, exactly the same, with no
provision for assessment or evaluation. The result is undue
harshness upon children who bring toy guns to school, and the
failure to assess a volatile student about to commit a grave act
of violence.
A. Danger that Zero-Tolerance Laws Will Completely Fail to
Protect Students' Property Interest in Attending
School
It is well settled that a student possesses a property inter-
est in a public school education that cannot be deprived without
256. 20 U.S.C. § 8921-23 (1994).
257. Compare W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-la (a), (g) (1995) with UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53A-11-904(2)(b) (1995).
258. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (1994).
259. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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some form of procedural due process.260 However, as discussed,
there is some confusion regarding the level of due process af-
forded to students before long-term suspension or expulsion;
whether minimum due process is sufficient, or whether expul-
sions and long-term suspensions warrant more formal proce-
dures. 261 The Supreme Court decision of Goss v. Lopez 2 6 2
indicated that more formal procedures than just notice and an
opportunity to be heard may be required. 263 Thereafter, a slight
qualification was added to this holding by Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,264 in which the Supreme
Court held that less stringent procedural due process applied to
academic dismissals than to disciplinary expulsions. 265 Thus,
the state of the law is that short-term suspensions require mini-
mum due process, but that long-term suspensions and expul-
sions may call for more formal procedures, except in the case of
academic dismissals, which may be less formal. The confusion
lies in that no direction has been provided as to long-term sus-
pensions and expulsions for disciplinary violations, aside from
the fact that procedures more formal than minimum due pro-
cess may be required.
This confusion should be resolved quickly. Without clear
guidelines as to what procedures are due a student facing ex-
pulsion, there exists a danger that some students will receive
less procedural due process than is necessary to ensure against
the erroneous deprivation of their property interest in attend-
ing public school. With increasing incidents of violence in
school, and expulsion as the tactic taken by schools to try to
control it, schools need clear direction as to how to protect stu-
dents' property interests while controlling their behavior.266
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994267 and the state laws
passed in compliance with this federal law have been designed
260. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 98-135. See discussion supra Part
II.B.1. for a discussion of minimum due process; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.
for a discussion of formal due process procedures, or "maximum due process."
262. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
263. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
264. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19, 134-35.
266. See discussion supra Part II.A.
267. 20 U.S.C. § § 8921-8923 (West 1994).
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to address the problem of school violence. 268 However, this fed-
eral law, as well as some state laws passed in compliance, pose
a danger to students' procedural due process rights, by sug-
gesting that no procedure is due at all before expulsion. 269 For
example, states such as Arizona, Colorado, Georgia and Iowa
mandate immediate expulsion for no less than twelve months
when a student is determined to have brought a gun to school,
with no provisions at all as to how the determination should be
made. 270 There are no provisions in these laws to allow the stu-
dent any form of notice or opportunity to be heard before the
expulsion. 271
Other states have explicitly excluded students who have vi-
olated the firearm policy from any sort of procedural due pro-
cess. 272 In Nevada, students in grades one through six who
have committed violations of the disciplinary code, such as com-
mitting a battery on an employee or sale or distribution of a
controlled substance, 273 are entitled to a review of their case by
the board of trustees of the school district. However, students
who have been found in possession of a firearm are specifically
excluded from this due process procedure.27 4 The statute reads:
Any pupil in grades 1 to 6, inclusive, except a pupil who has been
found to have possessed a firearm in violation of subsection 2, may
be suspended from school or permanently expelled from school
pursuant to this section only after the board of trustees of the
school district has reviewed the circumstances and approved this
action in accordance with the procedural policy adopted by the
board for such issues. 27 5
268. See discussion supra Part II.F.2.
269. See Chart: State Laws in Compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1), The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, supra Part II.F.2.
270. See id.; Amz. REV. STAT. § 15-841(G) (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-
106(d)(I) (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1(a), (c) (1995); IOWA CODE § 280.21B
(1996).
271. See Chart: State Laws in Compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1), The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, supra Part II.F.2.; ARiz. REV. STAT. § 15-841(G)
(1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-106(d)(I) (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1(a),
(c) (1995); IowA CODE § 280.21B (1996).
272. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.466(1) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 193.13(111) (1969) (amended 1996).
273. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.466(1) (1995).
274. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.466(5) (1995).
275. NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.466(5) (1995) (Subsection two reads: "any pupil
who is found in possession of a firearm while on the premises of any public school,
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Through this Nevada statute, procedural due process is
specifically provided to all students who have committed a vio-
lation placing them at risk for expulsion, at least in grades one
through six, except those who have brought a gun to school. 276
In effect, a fifth grader who commits a battery upon his teacher
is entitled to have his expulsion reviewed by the board of trust-
ees of the school district. A fifth grader who is discovered to
have a gun in his or her book bag will be automatically expelled,
with no provision for review by the board of trustees, even if an
investigation would have shown that a classmate had planted
the gun without the student's knowledge.
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994277 should direct the
states to provide for procedural due process in conjunction with
the expulsion of a student for weapons possession in school. In
turn, the states that have not provided for procedural due pro-
cess should follow those states that have directed the use of
maximum due process before expelling a student for a year or
more.
The students at risk of having their procedural due process
rights violated are not necessarily students with evil intentions,
and are even children who have stumbled into violating the
very strict weapons policy without intending to do so. For ex-
ample, fifth-grader Shanon Borchardt Coslett from Boulder,
Colorado, was automatically expelled for accidentally bringing
her mother's paring knife to school. 278 Under the zero tolerance
law of Colorado, the school officials who expelled her were not
required to give her an opportunity to explain. 279 Even having
learned that she had accidentally possessed the paring knife,
and even dutifully turned it in once she discovered it, the school
officials stated they had no choice but to expel her, an honors
student who had made a simple mistake and meant no harm.280
at an activity sponsored by a public school or on any school bus must, for the first
occurrence, be expelled from the school for a period of not less than one year." NEV.
REV. STAT § 395.466(2) (1995)).
276. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.466(5) (1995).
277. 20 U.S.C. § § 8921-8923 (West 1994).
278. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
279. See Chart: State Laws in Compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1), The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, see discussion supra Part II.F.2.; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 22-33-106(d)(I) (1996).
280. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
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It may be argued that expelling children like Shanon
Borchardt Coslett is necessary to send a message that weapons
in school will not be tolerated. However, a school system
should, and is indeed required to, look at the individual circum-
stance of the child expelled.2 1 Fifth-grader Shanon received a
message of intolerance to her circumstances as a student. She
learned that, no matter what circumstance might be easily ex-
plained to show that she was an honor student in good stand-
ing, who had made a simple mistake in taking her mother's
lunch instead of her own, she would be treated exactly like
those troubled, even psychotic students, who bring weapons to
school entirely on purpose to harm others. 2
82
This sort of direct punishment without provision for any
sort of procedures to ensure fairness or accuracy is not only a
violation of the procedures provided for by the Supreme Court
in Goss, but is a callous disservice to the child and his or her
family. Imposing the same harsh punishment upon a student
who accidentally violates this rule, and a student who has ill,
even evil, intentions in having possession of a gun, leads to fun-
damental unfairness. With no procedures required before ex-
pelling a child, there are no safeguards to ensure that the
punishment rendered was fitting for the behavior.
A first grade teacher in the Pittsburgh public school sys-
tem, Mary Potts, commented that zero tolerance laws are
flawed because they fail to take into account how children at
different age and grade levels respond to harsh punishment. 28 3
Under zero tolerance, every child is expelled for a year, regard-
less of age or circumstances. Mrs. Potts explained that students
at different age and grade levels respond to punishment and
view consequences differently. An older child can comprehend
that he or she is a member of a larger school community, and
that sometimes punishment is meant to send a message to
others about certain types of behavior. In contrast, younger
281. Under Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), every student possesses a
property interest in public school attendance that entitles him or her to at least
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and perhaps more formal procedures, when
facing long-term suspension or expulsion. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
282. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
283. Telephone Interview with Mary Potts, Teacher, Pittsburgh Public School
System (Nov. 1, 1998).
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children in general are approval-seeking and perceive punish-
ment as severe personal rejection.
Young children need more direct supervision to understand
the consequences of being punished. 2 4 Mrs. Potts commented
that automatic expulsion of a young child is a lost educational
opportunity for the school officials and the child. The teacher
explained that a child sent home merely feels rejected and re-
buked. Some children may even become angry or despondent,
exhibiting feelings of worthlessness, especially if the harsh pun-
ishment was not necessarily deserved and the child was not
given an opportunity to provide an explanation. Mrs. Potts sees
great possibility for some children if the school system could use
the situation as a teaching opportunity. She suggests taking
young children to the juvenile court system and the local jail for
an explanation of what happens if a person is caught with an
unlicensed weapon, or as a result of shooting incidents.
Even older children who are harshly punished experience
lasting negative consequences. Melissa McDonald, 16, who was
expelled from high school for three months, underwent a dis-
turbing attitude change that her mother watched develop since
the expulsion. 28 5 Melissa and a group of her friends had been
expelled when alcohol was found in a car in the school parking
lot.28 6 Even after returning to school the fall after her expul-
sion, Melissa's mother commented, "She hates school now ... I
think she needed to be severely punished, but she should have
been left in school. Now she can't wait until she's out."28 7
One must wonder what discipline is accomplished by forc-
ing a child to stay home. The description in the Chicago Trib-
une of Melissa McDonald's expulsion stated: "During the three
months that she was expelled from high school in 1996, Melissa
McDonald, 16, sometimes slept until noon. She spent her days
284. See Peter A. Williamson, Discipline: Holding the Line, PARENTING, May
1990, at 89, presented at ALBERT EINSTEIN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE OF YESHIVA UNI-
VERSITY MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF PEDIATRICS CLINIC CON-
FERENCE, Tantrums and Discipline, Jan. 18-22, 1999.
285. See Julie Deardorff, As School Expulsions Soar, Critics Worry Over Im-
pact, CHI. TRIB., April 23, 1998, at 1.
286. See id.
287. Id.
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watching TV or listlessly bouncing on the trampoline in her
back yard, waiting until her friends came home."288
Arnold Gallegos, an educator and chairman of the annual
Joint National Conference on Alternatives to Expulsion, Sus-
pension and Dropping Out of School, commented on the expul-
sion approach in this way: "Expulsion without any alternative
programming is damaging... You just cannot expel students
without supervision, guidance or education."28 9
The National School Boards Association (NSBA) has sum-
marized the studies done on suspensions and expulsions, in
part, as follows: "suspended students lose valuable instruction
and are likely to distrust the authority that has rejected
them."290 If most stable students are vulnerable to this distrust
and alienation, it is irresponsible to subject an unstable student
to expulsion, and its attendant effects upon the student, without
taking precautions. The NSBA has cautioned: "traditional ap-
proaches-such as punishment, removing troublemakers, and
similar measures-often harden delinquent behavior patterns,
alienate troubled youths from the schools, and foster
distrust."291
B. Danger that Zero Tolerance Laws Will Completely Fail to
Prevent Dangerous Behavior
As discussed, children likely to kill could be criminally
psychotic. 292 Expelling the innocuous student who is horsing
around with a water pistol, or who accidentally picked up their
parent's lunch with a paring knife inside, will send messages to
those students with in-tact senses of responsibility, but simply
will not serve to deter students who are psychopathic. The stu-
dents who act violently due to an internal psychopathy act with
no regard for the consequences endured by others for the same
behavior, and no desire to conform their behavior.293
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Bogos, supra note 161, at 380 (citing AmAIA E. CUERVO ET AL., TOWARD
BETTER AND SAFER SCHOOLS (1984)).
291. Id. at 381 (citing AMALIA E. CUERVO ET AL., TOWARD BETTER AND SAFER
SCHOOLS (1984)).
292. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
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There must be some sophistication in assessing these stu-
dents beyond expelling them and sending them home. In addi-
tion to risking damage to a child's self esteem, expulsion can
present an even more grave danger by sending a dangerous stu-
dent exhibiting acute signs of impending violence home, where
he or she may not receive adequate supervision. As Peter M.
Leavitt, a criminal court judge in Westchester County, ob-
served, leaving these students unattended with no school super-
vision simply to wander on their own, with little or no parental
direction is an exercise in futility which can result in more crim-
inal mischief and "acting out" on the streets.294 The very real
possibility is that the potentially violent student is released to
his parents, who may not be able to handle him, and thus be-
comes a threat to his neighborhood. Indeed, this "possibility"
has already happened.
Kip Kinkle was home on suspension during the time that
he allegedly committed the brutal murders of which he is ac-
cused. 295 School officials had determined that Kip Kinkle had
possession of a gun at school, and was immediately removed
from school on suspension to await likely expulsion.296 The day
following his suspension, he returned to Springfield, Oregon's
Thurston High School with three guns hidden under his trench
coat.297 Some students commented for the press later that they
were surprised to see Kip in school that day.298 They knew that
Kip had been suspended the day before for storing a loaded pis-
tol in his locker, and was banned from campus for an indefinite
period.299
What the Thurston High School officials should have been
aware of, however, was that this sort of return to school should
not have been unexpected. Some common sense principles, edu-
cated by advice from social science and psychology experts,
could have predicted exactly what is alleged to have occurred
next.300 A student, who could be characterized as psychopathic
294. Interview with the Honorable Peter M. Leavitt, Criminal Division, West-
chester County Court, in White Plains, N.Y. (Oct. 15, 1998).
295. See Sullivan, supra note 140, at 46, 47.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 47.
299. See id.
300. See generally Weiner, supra note 174.
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is sent home, where, statistics state, he is likely to have unfet-
tered access to weapons. 301 It is the most predictable of behav-
iors for this unstable youth, preoccupied with weapons violence,
to return to the scene of the expulsion for retaliatory
behavior.30 2
Schools must be equipped for a new era of school adminis-
tration, and the law must be able to accommodate it. Local
school districts are no longer dealing with students who can be
shamed into good behavior by a day or two of suspension. The
current era is one of sophisticated ingenuity, and sometimes
mental disease, at a young age. Today's students have acquired
knowledge of weapons and explosives and exhibit tendencies to
act on it.303 School administrators have to be more sophisticated
in their approaches than to simply send students home. They
must diagnose the particular student they are dealing with.
Imposing a blanket expulsion on every student will punish
undeserving students, and create dangerous situations in other
cases. Although the police department, which had been called
when the gun was found in Kip's possession, claimed that no
probable cause existed to take custody of Kip, they made this
assessment without the aid of a psychologist. 304 The difficulty of
the situation arose from the fact that Kip was only 15 at the
time of his suspension, and he did not seem to be a dangerous
person. Unfortunately, gone are the days when a child can be
assessed from appearances, background, and makeup of the
child's family. An underlying psychological disorder can exist
even in seemingly harmless children from the most upstanding
families. A 15-year-old has to be assessed as though he could be
a psychotic killer; teenage "idiosyncrasies" must be taken seri-
ously: threats, jokes about blowing up the school, gun posses-
sion, jokes about torturing animals.
The first step in devising personalized, effective responses
to school gun violence is to put each incident of gun possession
in school under the examination of every person involved: the
student, parents, and school officials. Providing a forum for dis-
cussion about the incident and development of a plan of punish-
301. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
302. See Weiner, supra note 174, at 815; see also Anglin, supra note 141.
303. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
304. See Sullivan, supra note 140.
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ment would allow the student to offer an explanation or to take
responsibility for the incident. In the alternative, it would al-
low school authorities to identify those dangerous students who
should be directed for mental evaluation and perhaps referred
to law enforcement. This sort of sophisticated diagnosis and re-
sponse would appropriately separate those students who misbe-
have out of rebelliousness or even misdirection from parents,
from those who are most dangerous. Providing for maximum
due process, allowing notice to the student and parents, a hear-
ing with witnesses for both sides, and a formal determination of
the facts of the incident as well as a detailed reason for the pun-
ishment, would build an assurance into the system that each
student who is caught with a weapon is both adequately as-
sessed and dealt with fairly.
IV. Providing Procedural Due Process: All States Must
Provide Formal Procedural Due Process Procedures When
Expelling a Student for a Year or More Pursuant to the
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994
To conform with the Supreme Court's guidance in Goss v.
Lopez, 30 5 directing that expulsions call for more formal proce-
dures than notice and an opportunity to be heard, and to build
an assessment device into the discipline of children who possess
a weapon at school, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994306 should
direct the states to apply formal procedural due process proce-
dures. The case from the Supreme Court that provides gui-
dance as to formal due process procedures, or "maximum due
process," is Goldberg v. Kelly. 30 7 The procedures outlined in
Goldberg should be incorporated into the Gun-Free Schools Act
of 1994308 and zero tolerance laws.
A student's property interest in a public education is simi-
lar to the property interest involved in Goldberg.30 9 In
Goldberg, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs pos-
sessed a property interest in welfare benefits which inured from
305. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
306. 20 U.S.C. § § 8921-23 (West 1994).
307. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
308. 20 U.S.C. § § 8921-23 (West 1994).
309. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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federal and state legislation. 310 Similarly, in Goss, the Supreme
Court found that students possess a property interest in access
to public education, which inures from state compulsory educa-
tion laws. 311 As with welfare benefits, the issue regarding pro-
cedural due process in the education context is whether the
state should give up its flexibility in terminating the benefit, i.e.
expulsion, to allow the person affected to contest the state
action.312
In Goldberg, the state desired to conserve its fiscal and ad-
ministrative resources by denying welfare benefits without hav-
ing to conduct a pre-termination hearing in every case.313
Similarly, the state has argued when challenged regarding its
procedures for suspending and expelling students that holding
hearings before every suspension or expulsion would "over-
whelm administrative facilities ... and cost more than it would
save in educational effectiveness." 31 4 Despite these arguments
in Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that the state, when ter-
minating a property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, had to provide notice, a hearing, an opportunity to
present and cross-examine witnesses, and a written decision
about the case before termination of welfare benefits. 315
Welfare benefits were deemed by the Goldberg Court to be
so essential to the welfare recipient that these procedures were
necessary to ensure fairness. 31 6 Education, similarly, has been
found by the Supreme Court to be "the most important function
of state and local governments,"31 7 and suspension or expulsion
to be a "serious event in the life of the suspended [or expelled]
child."318 Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, therefore,
formal procedural due process procedures are warranted and
proper in the context of student expulsion. In the words of the
310. See supra text accompanying note 88.
311. See supra text accompanying note 61.
312. See supra text accompanying note 89.
313. See supra text accompanying note 91.
314. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); see supra text accompanying
note 75.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
316. See supra text accompanying note 92.
317. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see supra text accom-
panying note 20.
318. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); see supra text accompanying
note 70.
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Goss Court, procedural due process is necessary because "it dis-
serves both [the student's] interest and the interest of the state
if [the student's] suspension [or expulsion] is in fact
unwarranted." 319
V. Conclusion
Providing for procedural due process will enhance the
school's ability to determine which students should be removed
from school for the safety of others. In turn, the procedures can
identify the students who do not pose a threat, and whose ex-
pulsion would be unnecessary and counterproductive. In addi-
tion to these very important practical considerations,
procedural due process will ensure that children expelled for
weapons violations receive the Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion that has been granted to all children through the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994,320 as well as
the zero tolerance laws that have failed to incorporate formal
due process procedures, should be rewritten to incorporate pro-
cedural due process. This approach will provide a legally con-
sistent and sophisticated response to weapons violence in
schools.
Children will be impressed with the great importance of the
violation, when served with notice and direction to attend a for-
mal hearing. Those students who made honest mistakes will be
given the opportunity to explain the situation, and can receive
punishment appropriate to the circumstances. In this way,
school officials can take opportunities to teach and provide gui-
dance to misguided students who can correct inappropriate, and
yet not dangerous, behavior.
As to those students on the edge of violent behavior, the
procedural aspects of due process will especially serve the stu-
dent and parents, as well as the school and surrounding com-
munity. Procedural due process provides the opportunity to
evaluate and assess a troubled student's motivations and un-
derlying problems. A child prone to criminal mischief, or on the
brink of extreme violence, can be identified and addressed by
319. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; see supra text accompanying note 79.
320. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-23 (West 1994).
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law enforcement or psychological treatment if necessary. Par-
ents unable to control their child will be given the opportunity
to ask for help.
Procedural due process can perform many functions in the
context of providing legally acceptable, efficient, and most im-
portantly, effective school responses to weapons violence. The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 should incorporate the powerful
rules of procedural due process into its policy against school
weapons violence.
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